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Chairman, Department of Health Policy,
Jefferson Medical College
In September 2007, the inaugural
issue of Prescriptions for Excellence
in Health Care painted the national
quality landscape with broad strokes,
dealing with issues such as culture
change in medicine and quality
initiatives at the state level. In this
issue, we narrow the focus to look at
advances in patient safety and quality
improvement in our nation’s hospitals.
Improving patient safety continues
to be an uphill battle on the hospital
front. In its 4th Annual Patient
Safety in American Hospitals Study
(April 2007), HealthGrades, an
organization that provides ratings and
profiles of hospitals, nursing homes,
and physicians, analyzed patient
safety among Medicare patients
in all US hospitals.1 Looking at
data from 2003-2005, they found
that despite increased attention to
improving quality and patient safety,
approximately 1.16 million total patient
safety incidents occurred in the course

of over 40 million hospitalizations.
These incidents were associated with
$8.6 billion in excess costs. Moreover,
10 of 16 studied patient safety incident
rates worsened by more than 11.5% on
average; the 6 indicators that improved
did so by 8% on average. Perhaps the
most disturbing finding was that of the
284,798 deaths that occurred among
patients who were affected by 1 or
more patient safety incidents, 247,662
(or 87%) were potentially preventable.
The 2006 Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality (AHRQ)
National Healthcare Quality Report
assessing the state of hospital quality
and patient safety2 was similarly
dispiriting. It concluded that positive
change in quality outcomes has been
modest and that variation in health care
quality remains unacceptably high.
We have seen positive effects stemming
from public reporting initiatives (eg,
the Pennsylvania Health Care Cost
Containment Council [PHC4]),3 but
the continued lack of any nationally
Prescriptions for Excellence in Health
Care is brought to Health Policy
Newsletter readers by the Department
of Health Policy in partnership
with Eli Lilly and Company to
provide essential information
from the quality improvement
and patient safety arenas.
(continued on page 2)
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Message from the
Lilly Hospital
Group Director
The Institute of Medicine
reports of the past 15 years have
revealed a range of opportunities
for improvement in quality and
safety in health care. In response
to these reports, health care
organizations and their leaders
began to transform their approach
to these 2 areas. To ensure that
health care organizations were
on board, key quality groups and
payers created quality measures
to promote awareness and foster
organizational commitment to
the goal of improving patient
safety and health care quality in
hospitals across the country.
The transformation of health
care requires commitment to a
common vision of what it can be,
and a steadfast belief that lasting
improvement in quality and
patient safety can be achieved.
There are still many obstacles to
overcome and lessons to share.
As a vehicle for communicating
lessons learned and best practices,
Prescriptions for Excellence is one
way in which Lilly can help move
this transformation forward.
As we at Lilly work diligently
to bring relevant products and
information to the hospital
market through the Lilly Hospital
Group, we look forward to
partnering with you to improve
health care and patients’ lives.
Becki Morison
Executive Director,
Lilly Hospital Group

recognized system or structure for
identifying, reporting, and sharing
quality and patient safety information
remains a substantial barrier to
improvement in these vital areas.
In this issue, the authors describe
successful quality improvement
initiatives undertaken by 4 different
hospitals: an innovative approach
to eradicating methicillin-resistant
Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) at a
Philadelphia medical center; a strong
argument for redesigning hospital
facilities in order to reduce human
error, thereby preventing harm to
patients; a comprehensive quality
improvement plan involving an entire
academic health center in western
Massachusetts; and an intervention
directed at decreasing turnaround
time in a single department at
a health system in Delaware.

Upcoming issues will be devoted
to such topics as improving the
quality of care in outpatient settings
and the role of health information
technology and public reporting. I
hope that you will be as impressed as
I am with the range and scope of the
programs and initiatives described by
the authors, as well as with the level
of commitment represented by the
work at their respective institutions.
As always, I am interested in your
feedback and you can reach me by
email at david.nash@jefferson.edu.
References:
1. HealthGrades. Fourth Annual Patient Safety in
American Hospitals Study. April 2007. Available at:
http://www.healthgrades.com/media/dms/pdf/
PatientSafetyInAmericanHospitalsStudy2007.pdf.
2. Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. National
Healthcare Quality Report (NHQR) 2006. Rockville,
MD: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality; 2006.
Available at: http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/hhqr06/nhqr06.htm.
3. Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council.
Hospital-Acquired Infections in Pennsylvania. November
14, 2005. Available at: http://www.phc4.org/reports/
hai/05/nr111406.htm.

Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus (MRSA)
Eradication and Positive Deviance: Experience at
Philadelphia’s Albert Einstein Medical Center
By Jeff Cohn, MD, MHCM
MRSA is a strengthening enemy. A
minor health concern 50 years ago, it
is a growing cause of morbidity and
mortality in hospitals today. The
organism now affects at least 46 of
every 1,000 patients in hospitals
and nursing homes.1 Each year,
MRSA infections are associated
with billions of dollars in direct costs
and thousands of patient deaths.

following Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC)
hand hygiene guidelines2 is one
of the most effective means for
avoiding the spread of MRSA,
but fewer than 50% of health care
workers follow the guidelines
of washing hands before and
after entering patients’ rooms.3
Physician compliance is even lower.

Although basic procedures for
preventing infection have existed
for decades, too often health care
professionals fail to adhere to
them. For example, we know that

A typical institutional response to
this type of issue is to target people
whose behavior needs to change
and tell them what they need
to do differently. Interventions
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often include educational efforts,
changing policies, and/or providing
data. While such strategies are
useful, they fail to incorporate one
of an institution’s most valuable
resources – staff members whose
practices and behaviors might
serve as models. The term used to
describe these individuals and their
practices is Positive Deviance (PD).
Given that PD individuals have the
same resources and are part of the
same work “community,” we wanted
to know how these PDs managed to
overcome the common barriers in
order to achieve the desired outcomes.
We determined that an answer may
lie in observing, listening to, and
learning from these PDs - then
sharing those things the PDs found
useful with other staff members.
The PD4 approach is a process of
self-discovery that promotes and
facilitates positive behavior change
within a work community. Steps
in the PD process include:
• helping people define the problem
• helping the community identify
the PDs (ie, the individuals who
are already doing the right thing)
• learning about the practices,
behaviors, and strategies that
have enabled PDs to overcome
the same barriers faced by
everyone in the community.
This involves listening to and
observing the PDs, and creating
a forum wherein the entire
“community” can discuss the
problem and potential solutions.
• helping the “community”
design a method for spreading
the PD practices throughout
the organization.
Albert Einstein Healthcare
Network (AEHN) was chosen

as one of 6 beta sites in a Robert
Wood Johnson-funded effort to
eliminate transmission of MRSA by
applying PD concepts to infection
control. Six hospital units (the
medical step-down unit, surgical
ICU, transplant/oncology medical/
surgical unit, the Drucker Brain
Injury Unit at Moss Rehabilitation
Hospital, the medical ICU, and
a combined general medical/
surgical unit) volunteered as
pilot “communities” to test this
new approach, called “SMASH”
(Stop MRSA Acquisition and
Spread in our Hospitals).
Unit staff members are encouraged
to observe, discuss, learn, and
share with others. As a result, they
identify problems, create solutions,
and identify and learn from PDs.
A distinctive feature of the PD
approach is the way in which ideas
generated by those “touching”
the patient are rapidly translated
into actions. Each week multiple
groups from our workforce meet
for brief “Discovery and Action
Dialogues (DADs).” Trained
facilitators capture ideas generated
by discussions and ask the key
DAD questions, such as, “What
does this mean to you?” and,
“What would it take to make
that happen here and now?”
Concrete actions are formulated
with specific responsibilities.
Who should be involved in
the DAD process? One of the
few “rules” of the PD process
is: “Nothing about me without
me.” This means that all
stakeholders must be represented
in order for DAD participants to
recommend an action. We now
ask ourselves, “Who doesn’t need
to be involved?” We have begun
to look beyond the usual suspects
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(ie, nurses and physicians) and
involve, for example, patient
transporters, the microbiology
lab, radiology, physical therapy,
hospital clergy, and translators.
Many DAD actions have been
implemented and, cumulatively,
we believe the application of these
PD practices will lead to sustained
organizational change. One
example is the new approach to
the storage of disposable gowns.
People entering the isolation
room of a MRSA patient are
asked to don disposable gowns.
Early in the DAD process, lack of
availability of these gowns at the
point of entry into these rooms was
identified as a barrier to consistent
behavior. The DAD determined
that the storage cabinets – opaque
structures located inside patient
rooms - were contributing to the
problem. A clinician preparing
to examine a patient in isolation
might enter the room, open the
cabinet, find it empty, and have
to search for a gown elsewhere
– or, as often happened, become
frustrated and perform the task
without donning a gown. In a
series of small steps, gowns were
1) moved from the cabinets inside
the room to boxes on tables outside
the room, 2) wrapped individually
and stacked on those tables, and
3) stored in clear cabinets on the
walls outside the room, making
it easy to check on supply and to
anticipate the need for restocking.
AEHN’s pilot units have begun
to do surveillance cultures during
patient admission, transfer, and
discharge. They receive data about
MRSA prevalence, transmission,
and compliance with hand hygiene
and gown/glove use on a regular
(continued on page 4)
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(continued from page 3)
basis. Patients identified as being
colonized with MRSA are flagged
in the clinical information system
and placed in contact isolation.
We have learned that over 20%
of patients in some of our units
are colonized with MRSA on
admission; that multiple prior
hospitalizations, residence in nursing
homes, and being on hemodialysis
are significant risk factors for
colonization; and that hospital
transmission is clearly preventable.

Safe By Design
By John Reiling, PhD
To Err is Human: Building a Safer
Healthcare System awoke the health
care industry to the fact that many
patients die from preventable
conditions - and many more patients
experience a preventable adverse
event. One in every 30 patients
admitted to a US hospital suffers from
a preventable adverse event, and 1
in every 300 patients admitted to a
US hospital dies from a preventable
condition or circumstance.
Could a hospital facility’s design,
technology, and equipment affect the
safety of patients? Could a hospital
facility create conditions under
which caregivers provide safer care?
The Learning Lab Experience
To answer these questions and others,
SynergyHealth St. Joseph’s Hospital of
West Bend, WI, convened a National
Learning Lab in April 2002. More
than 100 people attended, the major
participants being high-level leaders
from key organizations involved
in the patient safety movement,

The PD process is helping AEHN
attain its goal of caring for critically
ill MRSA negative patients
for many weeks at a time in an
environment where other patients
are colonized with MRSA - and
have those patients remain MRSA
negative at discharge. AEHN
patients are already benefiting
from the PD practices that the
workforce community has put
into action. Eventually, we will
achieve the goal of SMASH we will stop MRSA acquisition
and spread in our hospitals.

including: American Hospital
Association (AHA), American
Medical Association (AMA),
American Pharmaceutical Association
(APhA), American Society for Quality
(ASQ), Institute for Healthcare
Improvement (IHI), Institute for Safe
Medication Practice (ISMP), The
Joint Commission ( JCAHO), Medical
Group Management Association
(MGMA), National Patient Safety
Foundation (NPSF), Patient Safety
Institute (PSI), University of
Minnesota (U of MN), University of
Wisconsin-Milwaukee (UW-Milw),
Veterans Administration, Midwest
Patient Safety Center of Inquiry (VA),
Veterans Healthcare Administration
(VHA), and Wisconsin Hospital
Association (WHA).
The multiple presentations that formed
the background for The Learning
Lab focused on human error and its
causes, and James Reason’s theories of
latent conditions and active failures.
“To err is human. Fallibility is an
inescapable part of the human condition.” 1
“Correct performance and systematic
errors are two sides of the same coin.” 2
Human error has been studied
for many years by many different

Dr. Cohn is Chief Quality Officer
at Albert Einstein Medical Center
in Philadelphia, PA. He can be
reached at cohnj@einstein.edu.
References:
1. National Prevalence Study of Methicillin-Resistant
Staphylococcus Aureus in U.S. Healthcare Facilities.
Available at www.apic.org/MRSAStudy.
2. CDC Guideline for Hand Hygiene in Health-Care
Settings. Available at: http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/
mmwrhtml/rr5116a1.htm.
3. Pittet D. Improving adherence to hand hygiene
practice: a multidisciplinary approach. Emerging
Infectious Diseases. 2001;7(2):234-240. Available at:
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol7no2/pittet.htm.
4. Marsh DR, Schroeder DG, Dearden KA, Sternin J,
Sternin M. The power of positive deviance. BMJ.
2004;329:1177-1179.

professionals. The collective work
of cognitive psychologists James
Reason, Jens Rasmussen, and Donald
Norman forms the basis of a widely
accepted theory of why humans err.
This work has inspired environmental
designs that minimize the occurrence
of errors and the harm they can
cause. Lucian Leape describes this
as “the pathophysiology of error.”3
The organizational issues that create
the conditions for error are called
latent conditions. According to
Reason, “These latent conditions are
adverse consequences which may lie
dormant within the system for a long
time, only becoming evident when they
combine with other factors to breach
the system’s defenses.”1 Examples of
latent conditions are poorly designed
facilities, including their technology
and equipment, system design issues,
training gaps, staff shortages or
improper staffing patterns, and poor
safety culture. These are what Reason
describes as “blunt end” occurrences.
Errors made by doctors, nurses,
pharmacists, and other personnel
at the point of service are called
active failures. Reason describes
these as “sharp end” occurrences,
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and their effects are felt almost
immediately.1 Examples are incidents
such as a nurse delivering the
wrong medication, or a physician
performing wrong-site surgery.
Latent conditions are present in
all organizations and are usually
created by upper management by
way of their responsibility for design
systems, staffing, and policies.
Active failures are committed
by employees as they interface
with patients and the systems or
facilities. Active failures happen
one at a time; latent conditions can
precipitate multiple adverse events.
Eliminating or minimizing latent
conditions has a greater impact
on human error than focusing
on an individual active failure.
Hazards are inherent in health care
as with any complex organization. In
Managing the Risks of Organizational
Accidents, James Reason developed a
model of error reduction. Defenses
could include technology, equipment,
well-designed facilities, systems
with standardized protocols, or
human checks of a process. The
more complicated or linked (tightly
coupled) the defenses are, the more
likely the defenses will fail.4
Multiple defenses exist in most
health care processes; for example,
most medication systems have
multiple checks (eg, physician
orders, nurse checks, pharmacist
checks, nurse rechecks). Potential
errors that could result in the
wrong drug being delivered to
the wrong patient are generally
caught at one of the checkpoints.
This method for catching an
error before it causes harm is
defined as a “near miss.”
Errors periodically escape all
the defense checks, resulting in

an active failure and/or adverse
event. Analysis of active failures
or adverse events suggests
that the root causes are latent
conditions. Figure 1 shows how
the various causes of error can
penetrate defenses and result in
error. This model also illustrates
how decreasing latent conditions

5

or helping caregivers correct an
error before it leads to harm.
Translating Theory into Practice
The Learning Lab participants
believed that facilities, with their
technology and equipment, could
affect the safety of patients and the
caregiver’s ability to deliver safe

Figure 1. Where Do “the Holes” Come From?
Source: Adapted by John Wreathall, from James Reason, Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents
(Aldershot, England: Ashgate Publishing, 1997)

and active failures would lower
error rates that lead to harm, thus
raising the level of patient safety.
Patient safety will be enhanced by
improving human factors through
facility design that minimizes the
latent conditions and cognitive
failures that lead to adverse events.
This will entail developing a strong
safety culture, and redesigning
systems or facilities - including
their equipment and technology with a focus on either eliminating
the conditions of cognitive errors

care. They recommended designing
around specific latent conditions
and specific active failures with the
goal of lowering harm to patients by
creating conditions wherein safe care
can be delivered. They recommended
other nontraditional approaches
throughout the facility design process
(Table 1). Finally, the Learning
Lab participants recommended
that the facility design process be
engineered to enhance or create a
safety culture that they defined.
(continued on page 6)
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Table 1. Design Recommendations

Design Recommendations
Latent Conditions

•

Medication Error-Related Events

• Noise Reduction

•

Wrong-Site Surgery Events

• Scalability, Adaptability, Flexibility

•

Oxygen Cylinder Hazards

• Visibility of Patients to Staff

•

Deaths of Patients in Restraints

• Patients Involved with their Care

•

Transfusion-Related Events

• Standardization

•

Patient Falls

• Automation Where Possible

•

MRI Hazards

• Minimizing Fatigue
• Immediate Accessibility of
Information, Close to the
Point of Service
• Minimizing Patient
Transfers/Handoffs
Active Failures
• Operative/Post-op
Complications/Infections
• Inpatient Suicides
• Correct Tube – Correct
Connector – Correct
		 Hole Placement Events

(continued from page 5)
The Learning Lab results are being
applied in many facilities design
processes. To date, the institution
that has most fully implemented the
recommendations of the National
Learning Lab is SynergyHealth St.
Joseph’s Hospital of West Bend. In
redesigning their medical/surgical
room, they applied the design
process recommendations, taking
into account latent conditions
and active failures. Personnel
who provide patient care were
integral to the design process.

Safety Design Process Recommendations

•

Establishment of a Checklist
for Current/Future Design

Safety Culture Recommendations
•

Shared Values and Beliefs about
Safety Within the Organization

•

Always Anticipating Precarious
Events

•

Informed Employees and
Medical Staff

•

Culture of Reporting

•

Learning Culture

•

Just Culture

•

Blame-Free Environment 		
Recognizing Human Fallibility

•

Matrix Development
(post Learning Lab)

•

Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
(FEMA) at each Stage of Design

•

Patients/Families Involved in
Design Process

•

Physician Teamwork

•

Equipment Planning from Day 1

•

•

Mock-ups from Day 1

Culture of Continuous
Improvement

•

Design for Vulnerable Patients

•

Empowering Families to 		
Participate in Care of Patients

•

Articulation of a Set of
Principles for Measurement

•

Informed and Active Patients

Using mock-ups and Failure Mode
and Effect Analyses (FMEA),
they focused on standardization,
visibility, and prevention of
medication errors, infections,
and falls in the room design.
Conclusion
Hospitals can become safer places.
A focus on safety by design can create
conditions wherein care is delivered
safely and patients are harmed less often.

References:
1. Reason J. Managing the Risks of Organizational
Accidents. Aldershot, England: Ashgate Publishing;
1997: 10-11.
2. Reason J. Human Error. New York: Cambridge
University Press; 1990: 2, 36.
3. Institute of Medicine (IOM). To Err is Human: Building
a Safer Health System. Washington, DC: National
Academy Press; 1999: 162.
4. Perrow C. Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk
Technologies. New York: Basic Books; 1984: 89-100.

Dr. Reiling is President and CEO
of Safe by Design. He can be reached
at jreiling@safebydesign.net.
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Improving Quality and Safety at an Academic Health Center
By Evan M. Benjamin, MD, FACP
Health Center Profile
Baystate Health is a 3-hospital health
system in Western Massachusetts. Its
flagship hospital, Baystate Medical
Center, is a 650-bed tertiary care
referral center on the Western Campus
of Tufts University School of Medicine.
The medical center has a 1200-member
medical staff with more than 250 fulltime faculty physicians. In 2006, the
medical center had more than 41,000
admissions and 27,000 surgeries.
Strategic Plan
Ten years ago, Baystate Health
created a long-term strategic plan
that has quality and patient safety at
its core. The leadership recognized
that providing the highest quality
and safest care was the right thing
to do – for our community and for
ensuring growth of the institution.
The Board’s priorities were to build
a robust quality and patient safety
improvement infrastructure (Figure
1) and to form a Quality Committee,
comprising clinicians and quality
improvement experts, to oversee
performance improvement, health care
quality, and patient safety activities.
The Performance Improvement
Council is responsible for operational
measurement and improvement of all
service lines. Each service line, in turn,
has a Performance Improvement Team
that is co-chaired by an operational
leader and a physician leader (usually
the department chairman) and includes
a performance improvement expert
and a multidiscipline staff within
that service line. These Performance
Improvement Teams have fixed
agendas based on specific goals to
improve effectiveness, patient safety,
mortality rates, and patient satisfaction.

Quality Improvement Infrastructure
BH Board
Division of Healthcare Quality
Quality Management
Case Management/
Utilization Review
Clinical Decision
Support

BH Board Quality Committee
Performance Improvement Council

Medical Management
Infection Control
Performance Improvement/
Peer Review
Performance Improvement
Service Line Teams

Research

— Adult Medical/Surgical ICU PI Team
— Ambulatory Services PI Team
— Behavioral health Services PI Team
— Cardiac Services PI Team
— Children’s Hospital PI Team
— Emergency Medicine PI Team
— Medical Services PI Team

— Oncology Services PI Team
— Pathology Services PI Team
— Pulmonary Services PI Team
— Radiology Services PI Team
— Surgery/Anesthesia Services PI Team
— Trauma Services PI Team
— Women’s Services PI Team

Figure 1. Quality Improvement Infrastructure
Led by a physician vice president with
other medical staff functioning in
full- and part-time roles, the Division
of Healthcare Quality (DHQ) helps
to align all quality management,
case management, infection control,
performance improvement, and
clinical decision support functions.
When annual objectives are set for
health care quality, the DHQ sets
specific goals to drive change and
improvement at the medical center.
Personnel at all levels – from fulltime faculty and medical staff to
senior leaders – must be engaged
in advancing quality and patient
safety. Senior leaders in particular
must understand that the “business
case for quality” focuses on the
benefits of quality improvement (eg,
good reputation, increased service

volume), but also recognizes that poor
quality is costly to the health system
because it increases the likelihood
of readmissions, complications, and
untimely death, and is associated with
longer lengths of stay and higher
costs. Early on, Baystate’s senior
leadership supported the strategic plan
by investing in new ways to reduce
practice variation and improve quality
and patient safety. That investment has
resulted in improvement of the bottom
line and the system’s reputation. In
addition to the quality and safety
initiatives mentioned, the system
has improved efficiency by lowering
1) inpatient and outpatient costs, 2)
length of stay, and 3) inpatient and
outpatient pharmacy costs through
a reduction in practice variation.
(continued on page 8)
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(continued from page 7)
Strategies for improvement
The 4 major improvement strategies
that continue to guide Baystate’s quest
for performance excellence are 1)
information technology, 2) measurement
and reporting, 3) organizational change,
and 4) process redesign and reliability.
1. Information Technology (IT). The
information infrastructure was improved
to support an electronic medical record
(EMR) and computerized physician
order entry (CPOE) system. This
robust information infrastructure has
supported efforts to reduce medical
errors and practice variation by
allowing guidelines and order sets to
be imbedded in the CPOE system,
providing medical decision support
in real time, prompting consistent
choices in health care delivery, and
enabling the longitudinal data collection
necessary for understanding care
outcomes. IT also supports a nonpunitive safety culture via an online
safety reporting system that allows
staff to enter data on all errors and
“near-misses” in the health system.
2. Measurement and Reporting. Process
and outcomes measurement is essential
for fostering open discussions about
quality and patient safety. The
performance improvement system uses
data from all service lines to assess and
improve care based on best practices
and benchmarking. Updated reports
on processes, mortality, and costs as
compared to national benchmarks are
used to drive Baystate’s performance.
One area of focus has been reducing
hospital complications and hospitalacquired infections by targeting the
prevention of surgical-site infections,
ventilator-associated pneumonia,
and bloodstream infections.
3. Organizational change. Physicians
and clinicians work in teams that care

for populations over time. We have
begun to teach specific team skills that
incorporate human factors principles and
cultural change to improve quality and
patient safety. The goal of teamwork
training is to introduce tools and
strategies to improve communication
and teamwork, thereby reducing the
chance of error and providing safer
care. Another important organizational
change concept is understanding
safety as a system property. We have
used the AHRQ Team STEPPS
curriculum as a foundation for our
teamwork training (http://www.usuhs.
mil/cerps/TeamSTEPPS.html).
4. Process Redesign using reliability
principles. Reliability can be defined as
a failure-free operation over time. The
Institute of Healthcare Improvement’s
innovation team has developed a
failure rate vocabulary to describe
processes in health care1; for instance,
• 10-1 reliability = approximately
1 defect per 10 process
opportunities. It is generally
associated with inconsistent
processes that lack human
factors principles in their design.
• 10-2 reliability = approximately 1
defect in 100 opportunities. This
reliability designation indicates
the use of human factors design
principles.
• 10-3 or better performance indicates
the use of human factors design
principles with a specific framework
to further mitigate failure.
To achieve truly reliable care of 10-2
reliability or better, our health care
system must employ concepts of
human factors design principles with
a framework to mitigate failure.
Baystate’s Quality Improvement Process
Areas of opportunity are detected through
a measurement and benchmarking
process. Quality action teams (formed

by Performance Improvement [PI]
Teams at the medical center) consisting
of key physician champions review
processes and work with performance
improvement experts to help adapt
and develop evidence-based clinical
practice guidelines. The quality action
teams attempt to redesign processes
to achieve a 10-2 reliability rating.
Using improvement tools, PI teams
measure and track progress, accelerating
improvement through cycles of the
Plan-Do-Study-Act (PDSA) processes.
Recommendations are disseminated
through mailings, grand rounds, pocket
cards, and handheld electronic devices
(eg, PDAs), as well as in the EMR and
IT infrastructure. The CPOE is used to
communicate guidelines and order sets
for standardizing care. Finally, Clinical
Effectiveness Nurses and Hospital Case
Managers form a “quality safety net,”
working with physicians to promote
adherence to best practices guidelines.
Outcomes
Multiple processes were redesigned
by adopting reliability principles.
Standardization of care based on evidence
has resulted in reduced practice variation,
increased reliability of processes, and
improved outcomes. A newly developed
quality dashboard (Figure 2) is shared
with the Board Quality Committee to aid
in tracking our “big dots” of Effectiveness,
Mortality, Safety, and Patient Satisfaction.
The “effectiveness score” is a composite
score of more than 60 process measures
throughout the health system, including
publicly-reported core measures and
numerous processes in key clinical areas.
Aggressive benchmarks are used to assure
performance in the top decile nationally.
Mortality is tracked by population, by
service line, and overall. Risk-adjusted
mortality rates have remained stable or
declined in the health system over the past
10 years. “Patient safety score” (ie, a rollup score of hospital-acquired infections
and postoperative complications such
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Baystate Medical Center FY 2006-2008 Strategic Plan Metrics
as of September 2006 YTD (Updated 1/8/2007)
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Figure 2. Quality Dashboard
as venous thromboembolism and
myocardial infarction) are tracked
against a national benchmark to gauge
progress and performance compared
to peers. Patient satisfaction is also
tracked against a national benchmark
and reported to senior leadership
on the clinical quality dashboard.
Conclusions
• Improving quality and patient
safety is the result of strategic

combines expertise in improvement
methods, knowledge of reliability
science, and concepts of the system
properties of patient safety.
• Physicians play a pivotal role
as champions and leaders in
improving health care quality.

BMC
Target

MORTALITY

1.2
0.9
Index

100
90

BMC
Top Decile HQl

% Excellence
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planning with a specific vision
and investment in infrastructure.
• The organization must understand
the rationale for quality improvement
and the business case for quality.
• An intentional strategy that helps
to align numerous departments
across the organization is necessary
for success.
• It is important to have a quality
improvement infrastructure that

• A culture of openness is vital
to the success of an organization’s
quality and safety program.
• Forums to discuss quality of
care and medical errors must
exist in the organization.
• Specific strategies - including IT,
a robust measurement system,
openness to change, redesign based
on human factors, and teamwork are vital to success.
Dr. Benjamin is Vice President, Chief
Quality Officer at Baystate Health and
Associate Professor of Medicine at Tufts
University School of Medicine. He can
be reached at: evan.benjamin@bhs.org.
References:
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Quality Improvement Project to Decrease Inpatient Radiology Turnaround Time:
Experience at Christiana Care Health System
By Paula L. Stillman, MD, MBA
with Robert E. Garrett, RT and Stephanie A. Cooper, BS, RT
This quality improvement project was
an intervention designed to decrease
radiology turnaround time. Success
factors included the use of elegant
technology and frequent public
feedback to the radiologists until
the desired results were achieved.

In 2004, the inpatient radiology
turnaround time* at Christiana Care
Health System was excessive. A
quality improvement project was
implemented with the following goals:

The radiology group at Christiana Care
Health System is a private practice
group consisting of 32 members
who have an exclusive contract with
the health network for inpatient
and outpatient imaging services.

• have reports available on patient’s
chart in a shorter time period

• improve radiology report
turnaround time

• decrease length of stay
• reduce transcription costs.
* Time from order of exam to report verification

Baseline data collected between
January and April 2004 revealed
that imaging report turnaround
time averaged 50 hours. The “gold
standard” for report turnaround is
24 hours or less.1 In April 2004,
only 16% of imaging reports were
completed in 24 hours or less. The
quality improvement team mapped
the current process flow (Figure 1)
and determined that the greatest
opportunity was to shorten the times
(continued on page 10)
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April 2004

Exam Ordered

3 hrs
Exam Completed

15 hrs
Radiologist reviews films and dictates

20 hrs
Transcriber types report
and sends to radiologist

12 hrs
Radiologist reviews, edits, and signs report

Figure 1. Process Flow
(continued from page 9)
between the radiologist reviewing the
films, dictating the report, editing
the report, and having the report
available on the nursing unit.
Phase 1 – Speech Recognition Software
The first step in redesigning the process
was purchasing Powerscribe© speech
recognition software and installing it
in 2004. The assumptions were that:
•

The system will deliver 95%
accuracy for speech recognition.

•

The radiologists will
accept the new system.

•

The radiologists will
self-edit their reports.

•
•

Adequate workstations
will be available.
Speech recognition software
will interface with existing 		
network software and hardware.

The radiologists were trained over
a 2-month period from April to
May 2004. The transcriptionists
were trained to edit rather than
type reports. Workstations were
installed in all film reading areas.
Increased information technology
(IT) services support was made
available, especially during peak
hours, and several radiology support
staff were trained to be “super users.”

Phase 2 – Picture Archival
Computer System
The next process improvement was
the implementation of a picture
archival computer system (PACS) for
computerized tomography (CT) and
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)
in September 2005. This technology
allowed images to be viewed at
individual workstations. By January
2006, 78% of exams were completed
in 24 hours or less; by January 2007,
88% of exams were completed in 24
hours or less, performance that was
maintained through May 2007.

During the installation phase, initial
software problems resulted in the loss
of some reports, causing frustration
among the radiologists. Several
issues remain unresolved. Although
all radiologists have accepted speech

Radiology Report Turnaround Time
50

Baseline

40

Rate

Process Flow

transcriptionists. Preimplementation,
14 full-time transcriptionists were
employed and an additional $200K
per year was spent for outsourcing.
Postimplementation, the number of
full-time transcriptionists was decreased
to 5, and outsourcing was unnecessary.
The transcriptionist’s role changed from
a transcriber of dictation to an editor of
transcribed material, resulting in annual
cost savings of more than $550,000.

By June 2005, 74% of exams were
completed in 24 hours or less.
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Figure 2. Report Turnaround Time
Use of Self Editing — Feb 2007
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Figure 3. Self-Editing Usage
Figure 2 illustrates the change in
mean radiology report turnaround
time over the past 3.5 years. Although
each of the technologies positively
affected the turnaround time when
introduced, the greatest decrease
occurred with the introduction
of voice recognition software.
An added benefit of this process
improvement effort was the cost savings
realized from a reduction in the use of

recognition technology, several resist
self-editing. Figure 3 displays this
bimodal distribution for compliance
with self-edits among radiologists.
Transcriptionists continue to be
employed to do initial reports or edits
for the noncompliant physicians.
Several radiologists speak with accents
that cause the voice recognition
software to misinterpret words. Some
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radiologists are also reluctant to use
templates, which could significantly
reduce the dictation time.
Attempts to resolve these issues include:
• retraining voice files for radiologists
who continue to have voice
recognition difficulties
• weekly posting of each radiologist’s
use of voice recognition and self-edits
in an attempt to use peer pressure to
increase use of self-edits
• positive reinforcement and continued
communication with our radiologists
• external pressure from the Radiology
Department Chairman to increase
the use of templates.
There have been sporadic complaints
from radiologists and referring
physicians that radiology reports are
less accurate with the new system. To
address this concern, periodic audits
are conducted to evaluate the accuracy
of reports by comparing the results of
self-edits vs. transcriptionists’ edits.
Dr. Stillman is Professor of Medicine and
Pediatrics at Jefferson Medical College.
She serves as Senior Vice President
for Special Projects and President for
Health Initiatives at Christiana Care
Health System, Christiana, DE. She is
corresponding author and can be reached
at pstillman@christianacare.org.
Robert E. Garrett, RT
Administrative Director of Radiology
Christiana Care Health System
Stephanie A. Cooper, BS, RT
Administrative Director, Christiana
Care Imaging Services
Christiana Care Health System
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Quality Improvement/Patient Safety
Meetings of Interest in 2008
February 13-15
American Health Quality Association (AHQA): 2008 Annual Meeting and Technical
Conference, San Francisco, CA
 http://www.ahqa.org/pub/inside/158_672_2428.cfm
February 20-23
American College of Medical Quality (ACMQ) Annual Meeting presented in
conjunction with the American College of Preventive Medicine, Austin, TX.
 http://www.preventiemedicine2008.org/
May 5-7
Quality Institute for Healthcare, American Society for Quality: World Conference
on Quality and Improvement, Houston, TX.
 http://www.qihc.asq.org/
May 15-16
National Patient Safety Foundation (NPSF): 10th Annual Patient Safety Congress,
Gaylord Opryland Resort/Convention Center, Nashville, TN
 http://www.npsf.org/npsfac/
August 24-27
7th Annual Quality Colloquium, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.
 http://www.qualitycolloquium.com
September 18-19
The Joint Commission: Annual Infection Control Conference, Chicago, IL.
 http://jcrinc.com/26580/
November 20-21
The Joint Commission: National Conference on Patient Safety and Quality.
Chicago, IL.
 http://jcrinc.com/26580/
December 8-11
20th Annual National Forum on Quality Improvement in Health Care.
Nashville, TN.
 http://www/ihi.org/IHI/Programs/ConferencesAndSeminars
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Share Your “Best Practices” with Readers
Have you implemented an innovative quality improvement program at your hospital, health plan, or clinical practice that has had a
positive impact on patient access, outcomes, or satisfaction? Prescriptions for Excellence welcomes submissions of articles up to 1200
words in length. To submit an article, or for more information, contact Jan Clarke at Jefferson’s Department of Health Policy at
(215) 955-9997 or Janice.Clarke@jefferson.edu.

#MG49500

This newsletter was jointly developed by the Department of Health Policy at Jefferson Medical College and Eli Lilly and Company and is supported through funding by Eli Lilly and Company.

